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Why the Burden of Proving Causation
Should Shift to the Defendant under the
New Federal Trade Secrets Act
Robert A. Kearney*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The new federal Defend Trade Secrets Act1 is like a surprise addition
to a family: a happy though puzzling event followed by a genuine concern
about how it is going to be cared for and fed over the next twenty-five or so
years.2 That is because while trade secrets have always been considered
part of intellectual property law,3 the secrets have never been protected by
federal legislation, unlike patents,4 trademarks,5 and copyrights.6 The law
in those traditional IP areas is fairly mature in the federal courts, though
certainly not orderly or structured. Civil trade secret cases have always
been local, state court matters, placed on the same docket as tenant disputes
and custody fights, unless a case has landed in federal court under diversity
jurisdiction.7 The typical trade secret case is welcome in federal court now,
 Edward R. Telling Professor, Illinois Wesleyan University. B.A., University of Notre Dame;
M.B.A., University of Illinois at Chicago; J.D., Notre Dame Law School.
1. See Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-53, 130 Stat. 376 (amending the
Economic Espionage Act to allow private parties to seek civil remedies in Federal Court for trade secret
misappropriation and codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 et. seq. (2015)).
2. It took more than twenty-five years for Congress to amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 in a meaningful way. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-66, 105 Stat. 1071.
3. “This is an important case because trade secret protection is an important part of intellectual
property, a form of property that is of growing importance to the competitiveness of American
industry.” Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Inds., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 180 (7th Cir. 1991); but see
Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-53, § 2(g), 130 Stat. 376, 382. (“This section and
the amendments made by this section shall not be construed to be a law pertaining to intellectual
property for purposes of any other Act of Congress.”).
4. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (2015).
5. See 17 U.S.C. § 1051 et. seq. (2015).
6. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2015).
7. On the criminal side, the misappropriation of trade secrets has been a federal crime since 1996
by virtue of the Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104‐294, § 101, 110 Stat. 3488 (codified

[1]
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and given its long wait for that kind of acceptance, it might be forgiven for
saying thanks, but no thanks.
Eventually, though, trade secret practitioners will find their way to
federal court, if not by plaintiffs then by defendants through the removal
process. And when they get there, they will find federal judges who no
longer need to be worried about what the highest court in a particular state
would say, as they usually must when sitting in diversity.8 Attorneys will
find judges who are free to start creating a federal common law to support
trade secret litigation just as they have done in other areas, such as under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 over the last fifty years.9
Congress passes spare laws, leaving the work of interpretation to the
Courts. So the work of these judges will be long-term and slow moving.
The issue for these federal courts is the same issue facing the surprised
parent: what are our hopes for this new addition and how might we correct
the mistakes we made the last time? The answer to the first question
should be simple: it should live up to its name and help trade secret owners
stop theft. Their secrets might not be registrable in Washington like
patents, trademarks, and copyrights are,10 but their competitive value is no
less and in some instances much more.
The answer to the second question is to decide soon what will be
expected of litigants to win these cases. It has taken a half-century of
litigating employment discrimination cases to determine what fundamental
terms mean, starting with the word sex,11 and whether a defendant can be
liable if it makes an employment decision for more than one reason and at
least one of those reasons is lawful.12 Similarly, litigants waded through
the federal courts for decades before the Supreme Court determined who
can be liable for certain bad acts such as harassment.13 Even long after
Title VII’s passage, it is fair to say that proving a discrimination case is
neither orderly nor particularly understandable. In fact, it is a hodgepodge

at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1839 and amended by Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-53, 130
Stat. 376).
8. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Menards, Inc., 285 F.3d 630, 633-35 (7th Cir. 2002) (applying Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938)).
9. As one example of federal common law creation under Title VII, see Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986) (instructing courts to “look to [common law] agency principles” in
determining the scope of employer liability in hostile environment harassment cases).
10. Indeed, “[t]rade secrets often are unpatentable.” Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S.
470, 497 n.3 (1974).
11. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239-40 (1989) (interpreting "because of . . .
sex" in Title VII to also prohibit employment discrimination based upon someone's "gender").
12. See id. at 252 (discussing the switching burden of proof in mixed-motive cases).
13. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A) (2015).
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of proof patterns and presumptions, and it would not be unfair to call it a
mess.
It does not have to be that way when it comes to federal trade secret
cases. Federal courts may not have asked for this new law, and whether it
has been welcomed may be disputable, but it is here now. At this point, the
goal should be to raise it the right way and to avoid the mistakes learned
after the passage of other major legislation.
Courts can start by giving the Defend Trade Secrets Act causation
standard that makes sense and gives plaintiffs a reasonable chance to prove
their cases. When it comes to damages, that means shifting the burden to
the defendant to prove that the plaintiff’s loss (or the defendant’s gain)
would have occurred anyway, even without the defendant’s theft. As it
presently stands and as discussed below, courts impose a “but for”
causation standard that means a defendant can easily take advantage of the
disruptive effects of its misappropriation. The change is simple: Where the
plaintiff’s loss is the natural result of the defendant’s bad act, but the
defendant points to other causes, it is the plaintiff who should get to say
“prove it.”
The new Federal Trade Secrets Act is an opportunity for federal courts
to get things right the first time and avoid the mistakes that state courts
have made in deciding trade secret cases. Big fixes should come first,
which means admitting that the reason so many cases lose is because when
it comes to causation we have it mostly wrong.
II.

STRAIGHT TO THE PROBLEM

The first decision that a plaintiff typically makes in a trade secret
misappropriation case is whether to try to stop the defendant immediately
from disclosing or using the stolen trade secret or whether to treat the
problem as a straightforward damages matter. If the disclosure or use can
be stopped, and if an injury would be difficult to repair and compensate,
then the plaintiff will pursue a preliminary restraining order and an
injunction.14 Proceeding quickly to stop an injury before it takes hold
makes sense, but it is also risky: a judge may just as quickly decide that
what the plaintiff thought was a trade secret is not one after all, in which
case the plaintiff is in a worse position because it has forfeited any
deterrence leverage resulting from threatening the defendant with
litigation.15

14. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(A) (2015).
15. For that reason, if it is not a case where the Coke formula is at risk, a plaintiff often chooses to
communicate with the misappropriator in writing by sending cease and desist letters. One tactical
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Because misappropriation cases often emerge gradually as a plaintiff
learns more about what a defendant is doing and seeking an early
injunction carries risks, a plaintiff may decide to sue for trade secret
misappropriation and seek damages instead.
If the plaintiff sues, he must not only prove the existence of a trade
secret, and theft of it, but also that the theft actually caused his injury. In
these cases, injury takes the form of either the plaintiff’s loss in profits or
the unjust enrichment that the defendant enjoyed, but not both so as to
avoid the problem of overcompensation.16
Causation is one of the first tort elements taught to law students, and it
has been helpful for courts to think of misappropriation as a tort that is
similar to other employment-related wrongs. But causation is difficult to
prove17 and, as it stands, it is too difficult for many misappropriation
plaintiffs.18
A typical misappropriation case involves the following scenario: a
commercial insurance agent abruptly leaves his job to work for a
competitor agency and brings with him all the knowledge, including
customer information, that he needs to start immediately binding insurance
for his new employer.19 The problem is that his former employer treats
customer information as confidential, including the names of its
commercial customers, and in addition, the employee signed a
confidentiality agreement promising to treat the information as confidential
both during and after his employment. After starting at the new agency,
the employee sends out what he considers to be a new address
announcement but his former employer considers a solicitation. The letter
highlights all the things the agent can do “now” and how advanced his new
employer is, which is just an indirect way of digging at his former
employer and telling his former customers that he wants them back.20
The easy issue is whether the letter to the customers is a solicitation,
which matters if in addition to confidentiality the employee signed a

advantage of sending such a letter is the following: if the misappropriation continues, then the plaintiff
can argue that it was willful and malicious, which opens up the possibility of exemplary damages and
recovering attorneys’ fees. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836 (b)(3)(C)(D) (2015).
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(B)(i)(I)(II) (2015).
17. Causation is a problem in insider trading cases involving misappropriation too. See United
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 675-76 (1997) (discussing a “disclose or abstain from trading” rule in
the context of a proof problem).
18. See infra Part III.
19. See, e.g., Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roth, 485 F.3d 930, 933 (7th Cir. 2007).
20. See Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roth, No. 05 C 3839, 2005 WL 3700232, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Aug.
5, 2005).
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restrictive covenant that prohibited post-employment solicitation.21 Of
course it is a solicitation;22 if it were not, it would have been sent to the
employee’s family and minister too.23 But assume in this case that the
former agency is able to prove that its commercial customer list is valuable
and confidential, meaning the solicitation amounts to a misappropriation
whether or not a non-solicitation agreement also exists.24
The difficult question arises when the agent’s customers start leaving
the former agency to sign up with him, which of course results in less
money and commissions for that agency. Why did they leave? The answer
to that question should tell us what caused the agency’s loss. Certainly part
of the reason is the agent’s solicitation because the customers would not
have even known to move their business without it.25 But it is highly likely
that at least for some of the customers, there were other considerations at
play: they have a relationship with the agent and are loyal to him; he has
moved before and he brought the customers to the former agency in the
first place; and perhaps they are not pleased that the former agency has
made an issue of the agent’s leaving and threatened litigation, which makes
them resolute to leave with him.
Sorting through multiple reasons to explain an injury is the function of
a jury, so the case should not be suited for summary judgment.26 As it
stands in these cases, the defendant will argue that the plaintiff cannot
prove that taking or reproducing the plaintiff’s customer list was the actual

21. Whether such a covenant would be enforceable is beyond the subject of this article.
22. See Am. Loan Corp. v. Cal. Comm’l Corp., 211 Cal. App. 2d 515, 523-24 (1963) (“He sent
letters to all those on the list as well as monthly bulletins. It would be naïve indeed to assume that the
letter or bulletins were intended merely as general information.”).
23. Actually, some former employees try to lessen the obviousness of the mailing by sending it to
family and friends, too. See Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 2005 WL 3700232, at *16.
24. Of course it’s valuable, otherwise it would not have been stolen in the first place. See id. at
*13 (“If the 1700 pages of data had no utility, they simply would not have been downloaded, copies
would not have been retained, and the information would not have been used.”). And its value is
corroborated by the fact that the plaintiff kept it hidden from view. See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v.
DEV Inds., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The information contained in the drawings cannot
have been worth much if Rockwell did not think it worthwhile to make serious efforts to keep the
information secret.”).
25. See Planmatics v. Showers, 137 F. Supp. 2d 616, 623 (D. Md. 2001) (“[I]n the context of a
contract not to compete, it has been found that the fact of a breach accompanied by the directing of
profits to the breaching party can provide the requisite casual nexus even when the injured party has no
prior business relationship with the customers in dispute.”).
26. But see Id. at 624 (granting summary judgment on breach of contract claim on basis of
evidence that a “disputed customer voiced a strong objection to any future business dealings with the
Plaintiff independent of any alleged breach by [Defendant],” so a reasonable jury could not find that the
alleged breach “caused” Plaintiff’s loss of the customer), aff’d, 30 F. App’x. 117 (4th Cir. 2002).
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cause of plaintiff’s loss. The defendant will, after all, be able to point to
other possible explanations and perhaps even produce affidavits from
customers explaining the reasons why they left.27 The problem is that there
can be no controlled experiment here to determine whether they would
have left in the ordinary course of business without the agent’s hasty
solicitation and breach of his confidentiality agreement. He did in fact
solicit and in so doing he has in effect tampered with the crime scene. The
burden to prove one cause for its loss (the agent’s solicitation) and also to
disprove all other causes (loyalty or friendship to the agent, for example)
becomes an impossible one for the plaintiff.
III. IN SEARCH OF DIRECT EVIDENCE
In fact, many damages cases die at the causation stage. Sometimes the
reason is that the one true cause is simply untraceable under the
circumstances. Take the case of Nancy Harris’ late husband, who worked
around asbestos for years before dying from lung cancer.28 She sued one of
the makers of the asbestos, Owens-Corning, but numerous other companies
also manufactured asbestos-containing insulation. In addition, Harris
worked around other asbestos products, some of which produced dust.29 It
was certainly possible that Harris developed cancer from Owens-Corning
products, but it was also possible that it came from something else, which
made the odds evenly balanced at best. That was enough for the Seventh
Circuit to affirm summary judgment in favor of Owens-Corning. The court
held that, “When, at best, the possibilities are evenly balanced, the court
should enter judgment for the defendant on the ground that causation
cannot be proved.”30
In some respects, trade secret misappropriation cases are even harder
to prove than Nancy Harris’ case. In Harris’ case, all of the possible
explanations for her husband’s death pointed to a wrongful act (asbestos
dust in the air). In the misappropriation case described above, only one
reason is wrongful (taking the customer list) while the other possible
explanations are legitimate. In PFS Distribution Co. v. Raduechel, two
managers left their employer, a food distributor, and started their own

27. See, e.g., Hearn Insulation & Improvement Co. v. Bonilla, No. AW-09-990, 2010 WL
3069953, at *8 (D. Md. Aug. 5, 2010) (denying claim for lost profits in part on basis of affidavit from
customer explaining reasons it stopped working with contractor‐plaintiff, in particular that it had
become dissatisfied with plaintiff’s quality of work).
28. Harris v. Owens‐Corning Fiberglas Corp., 102 F.3d 1429, 1431 (7th Cir. 1996).
29. See id.
30. Id. at 1433.
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competing company after they were unhappy with their new salary offers
and the time it took to receive them.31 Within a month, two of their largest
customers at their old job started buying poultry from their new company.
What followed was predictable: their former employer sued for
misappropriation of trade secrets and numerous other claims.32
After the district court granted partial summary judgment to the
plaintiff on the misappropriation claim (and also found the managers
breached their fiduciary duties), the issues for the jury were causation and
damages.33 The jury returned a verdict for the managers and specifically
found that the misappropriation was not the proximate cause of any losses
experienced by the plaintiff. The Eighth Circuit affirmed and, citing trial
testimony, pointed to other possible causes for the losses. Among them
were quality issues with the plaintiff’s chicken; one customer would have
followed one of the defendants anywhere (a loyalty issue); and the
defendant’s decision to slow-walk the managers’ new salary offers.34 Two
of these reasons pointed the finger squarely at the plaintiff and suggested
that its injuries were self-inflicted.
The result in PFS Distribution is not unusual in misappropriation
cases and can even be called ordinary. It played out according to form in a
California case, Aerotek, Inc. v. Johnson Group Staffing, in which an
account manager for the plaintiff, a staffing company, quit and thereafter
took a job with a competitor.35 Once at his new job, he visited a number of
companies, including three former customers identified simply as
Companies A, B, and C. At trial, the account manager claimed that the
visit was not a solicitation, but agreed that its purpose was to make “an
announcement in general” and to provide a chance for the companies to
offer him business.36 The parties stipulated that the former employer’s
customer list was a trade secret; in addition, the manager had signed a
nondisclosure agreement that prohibited him from revealing the customers’
names.37
Apparently the timing of the manager’s departure and his personal
visits to Companies A, B, and C were not enough to persuade the trial court
that he had solicited them.38 And representatives for two of the companies

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

574 F.3d 580, 587 (8th Cir. 2009).
Id.
PFS Distribution Co., 574 F.3d at 587.
See id. at 590.
No. C 070832, 2014 WL 1978016, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. May 13, 2014).
Id. at *3.
See id.
See id. at *6 (referencing Aerotek’s attempts to show solicitation).
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testified that they did not want to work with the man hired to replace him.
So there was a good reason for the jury to conclude the plaintiff could not
prove that any misappropriation of the customers’ identities caused the
plaintiff any loss (in fact, the plaintiff’s expert’s calculations were based on
faulty assumptions and bad information).39
The misappropriation claim was undeniably weak, but it is concerning
that the California Court of Appeal made it a point that “[plaintiff] did not
call as a witness a single representative of any company for which it
alleged misappropriation.”40 When the plaintiff tried to get hearsay
evidence in through its own witness, the district court jumped on the
attorney:
The Court: I have to interrupt you to ask for, what is it, the fifth
time, why don’t you bring in [Customer C] or [Customer
A] or [Customer B] or whoever else has been the hearer of .
. . said solicitation?
Plaintiff’s Attorney: Well, Your Honor, I’m entitled –The Court:
Why don’t you do that?
Attorney: I am entitled to put on the case that my client wants to
put on and –
The Court: You are entitled to put it on with the rules of
evidence. Just because your client wants it in the record
does not mean it is going in.41

Of course it is true that hearsay evidence in the nature of “what did the
customer give as its reason for leaving” is inadmissible in these cases.42 At
another point in the same trial, the plaintiff’s lawyer made the same
mistake and the court again called for the customers:
Q. [From Plaintiff’s counsel to its own company witness]: [C]an
you characterize for me how those conversations went?
Defendants’ counsel: Objection.
The Court: [Counsel], what is it that I have to tell you to get you
to leave this area of inquiry. I have said you can’t bring to
this jury out of court statements. Those customers are not

39. See id. at *10 (noting that trial court found the expert testimony to be “an embarrassment” on
the issue of lost profits).
40. Aerotek, Inc., 2014 WL 1978016 at *6.
41. Id.
42. See FED. R. EVID. 801(c) (defining hearsay as a statement that (1) the declarant does not make
while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers in evidence to prove the truth of the
matter asserted in the statement).
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here in front of us. You could have subpoenaed those
customers . . . and put them here on the stand and
everybody could have been listening to them and then they
could have been cross‐examined. Absent that, having
declined to do that, you can’t bring it in through some other
witness.
You can’t do it by what they said, what they looked [at],
how they felt, how he felt, how – what the generic – where
are you going with this, [Counsel]? I am ordering you to
leave this area of inquiry because there is nothing that you
can bring in that is allowed by the hearsay rules of
evidence.43

The trial court was correct on the issue of hearsay. But both the trial
court and the plaintiff’s lawyer appear to be calling for direct evidence of
causation when such evidence is almost always lacking.44 The jury found
no misappropriation or violation of the nondisclosure agreement had taken
place. The trial court sanctioned the plaintiff by awarding the defendant
attorney’s fees. The trial court also found it important that the plaintiff and
its lawyers never “sought out the customers in question” to find out why
they had stopped doing business with the plaintiff.45 The reasons ranged
from a business downturn to one of the customers moving from the area.
Without direct evidence of causation, plaintiff may lose on appeal
even after winning lengthy trials. Indeed, in Hunter Buildings &
Manufacturing v. MBI Global, a Texas appeals court reversed a $4.4
million verdict against corporate defendants and two former officers of a
building manufacturer even though the jury found the defendants
misappropriated plaintiff’s trade secrets.46 The appeals court principally
objected to expert testimony in support of the damages award. The
plaintiff called only one expert to support its claim of lost profits; he
calculated a loss of over $26 million but he could not tell the jury precisely

43. See Aerotek, Inc., 2014 WL 1978016, at *6.
44. See First Fin. Bank v. Bauknecht, 71 F. Supp. 3d 819, 845 n.8 (C.D. Ill. 2014) (“Plaintiffs in
trade secret cases most often rely upon ‘a web of perhaps ambiguous circumstantial evidence’ of
misappropriation rather than ‘convincing direct evidence’” quoting PepsiCo., Inc. v. Redmond, No. 94
C 6838, 1996 WL 3965, at *15 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 2, 1996)). These cases are similar to conspiracy cases,
which are often “purposely shrouded in mystery” and where direct evidence is rare because most of the
“necessary information” to prove a case “is within the knowledge and control of the defendant and
unknown to the plaintiff.” See Adcock v. Brakegate, 164 Ill.2d 54, 66 (1995).
45. See Aerotek, Inc., 2014 WL 1978016, at *7.
46. 436 S.W.3d 9, 23 (Tex. App. 2014).
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why some projects were won and some projects or accounts were lost.47
According to the expert, it would have been difficult to tie the lost‐ profits
calculation to specific contracts that were lost because there was a
“disrupted market after the events,” which the appeals court stated was
“apparently a reference to the conduct alleged in [plaintiff’s] petition.”48
A further problem was that the before and after periods included some
acts by the defendants that were not unlawful; mixing lawful and unlawful
acts together before calculating lost profits does not answer the real
question, which is how much the unlawful acts alone cost the plaintiff.49
That may seem to be an impossible task for an expert because it is, but it
did not stop the appeals court from distinguishing a case where “the trial
court awarded [plaintiff] lost profits from a single client and there was
direct evidence that the client specifically indicated it would no longer be
working with [plaintiff] because of [defendant’s] involvement with one of
that client’s competitors.”50
When federal courts take the lead in deciding trade secret
misappropriation cases, they should rule out the notion that a plaintiff
needs direct evidence of causation, either through expert testimony or lost
customers, to prove its case.51
IV. LOOKING TO CONTRACT LAW FOR HELP
It may be more appropriate to treat misappropriation of trade secrets
as closer to a breach of contract claim than a tort. Many misappropriation
cases also involve breach of contract claims because the former employee
is accused of violating a confidentiality or non‐solicitation agreement.52
But even if they did not, misappropriation disrupts an implied contract

47. Id. at 18-21.
48. Id. at 19.
49. Id. at 20.
50. Hunter Bldgs. & Mfg., 436 S.W.3d 9, at 22 n. 21.
51. Direct evidence is a common term in employment law after Price Waterhouse, at 275‐79
(1989). But the Court did not define the term “direct evidence.” Federal Courts have in general set the
bar very high. See Damon v. Fleming Supermkts of Fla., Inc., 196 F.3d 1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 1999)
(giving an example of direct evidence as “fire Earley – he is too old”); see also Hasham v. Cal. State
Bd. of Equalization, 200 F.3d 1035, 1044 (7th Cir. 2000) (giving as an example a supervisor’s
statement, “I did not promote you because of your national origin”).
52. See Alan J. Tracey, The Contract in the Trade Secret Ballroom – A Forgotten Dance Partner?
16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 47, 69 (2007) (“It is common for an information owner to use a contract to
identify and protect trade secret information. When the information is used in conflict with the
contract, then the contract may be used as the basis for both a trade secret claim and a breach of contract
action.”).
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between an employer and employee even if it is not intentional.53 At a
minimum, the implied contract is an agreement not to steal.54
An additional reason to treat these cases as quasi-contractual:
causation is easier to prove in those cases. For most courts, a tort requires
proof of proximate cause, which includes “but for” causation,55 and it is not
easy to prove. Consider an employment law case where an employer gives
two reasons behind its decision to fire an older employee with poor
computer skills: the lack of skills and a bias that older employees are less
likely to ever be as good with computers as younger employees.56 It sounds
like a reasonably strong case, but the plaintiff still loses unless she can
prove that the employer would not have fired her if she had been younger
and equally unskilled.57 In other words, her age must be the real, “but for”
reason for her employer’s decision, as in the one that tips the balance
against her.58 (That is not true in Title VII discrimination cases, which only
require evidence that one of the reasons was unlawful even if it was not the
most important reason.)59
When misappropriation is seen as a breach of contract, the discussion
of damages is entirely different. Take the case of Merritt Lane, an
accountant who signed a four-year non-solicitation agreement with his new
employer, which had purchased his old one.60 Only four months later, he
opened up his own competing accounting service in the same building and
sent over 100 letters to his former clients.61 In the letters, he included his
fee schedule, a letter to engage him, and a disengagement letter for the

53. See id. at 65 (“Before the UTSA came into effect courts frequently relied upon a contract,
either express or implied, to afford trade secret protection to information.”).
54. See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 438 (7th Cir. 1987) (“Employment creates
occasions for opportunism” and “[o]ne term implied in every written contract and therefore, we
suppose, every unwritten one, is that neither party will try to take opportunistic advantage of the
other.”).
55. See Ciomber v. Coop. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 635, 640 n.1 (7th Cir. 2008).
56. Employment cases are similar to misappropriation cases in the sense that there is usually more
than one reason behind an employer’s job action against an employee, just as there is usually more than
one reason that explains why a business has lost customers.
57. See Gross v. FBL Fin’l Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 174 (2009).
58. Id. (explaining that under the ADEA, the key is which of the employer’s reasons had a
determinative influence).
59. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‐2(m) (codifying the mixed motive or motivating factor standard).
60. See Totaro, Duffy, Cannova & Co., LLC v. Lane, Middleton & Co., LLC, 2006 WL 4543337,
at *2 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Feb. 27, 2006), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 921 A.2d 1100 (2007).
61. See Totaro, 2006 WL 4543337, at *2. (Lane identified his clients by using his employer’s
software and then obtaining copies of its client list, which he did without his employer’s approval. It
may not have been necessary: “Ironically, Lane had most of his client names available to him in his
Quick Books program created prior to the merger” between his old and new employer.).
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clients to send to his former employer.62 The communications worked and
within a few weeks his former employer received 159 of these
disengagement letters.63
Lane’s former employer sued him for breach of contract but the
evidence at trial heavily favored Lane on the causation issue.
Approximately twenty-five clients testified similarly: they stayed with
Lane because of continuity, their personal relationship with him, and
dissatisfaction with his former employer’s services.64 Several testified that
they did not even remember receiving Lane’s solicitation. Both parties
stipulated that the testimony and experiences of other clients would be
substantially the same if they were called to testify.65
There could be no dispute that Lane violated his non-solicitation
agreement.66
But how could there be any damages? The clients who testified stated
they were not induced to move by Lane’s solicitation packet. As the
appellate court stated, “there appears at least at first blush to be no rational
basis from which to link Lane’s breach of contract to quantifiable damages
sustained by [plaintiff].”67
Nevertheless, the appellate court upheld the damages awarded by the
trial court and even agreed that Lane’s former employer had been
“unquestionably economically injured” by his actions.68 It explained: “The
close temporal proximity between the mailing of the solicitation letters and
[plaintiff’s] receipt of 159 Lane-crafted disengagement letters, is sufficient
evidence to infer that, had there been no interference, plaintiff would have
received the economic benefit of servicing these clients.”69
Though the Supreme Court of New Jersey reduced the damages award
to only one year, it agreed with the trial court and appellate court that the
key to the case was its grounding in contract, not tort.70 Proximate cause,

62. Id.
63. See id.
64. Id.
65. See id. at *3. (Parties can stipulate over any facts, which makes them proven). See H.
Hackford & Co. v. United States, 197 U.S. 442, 447 (1905) (“We think the parties were entitled to have
this case tried upon the assumption that these ultimate facts, stipulated into the record, were established,
no less than the specific facts recited.”).
66. See Totaro, 2006 WL 4543337, at *3 (“The trial court’s conclusion [that Lane breached his
agreement] is amply supported by competent credible evidence.”).
67. Totaro, 2006 WL 4543337, at *3.
68. See id.
69. See id. (emphasis unchanged).
70. See Totaro, 191 N.J. at 12.
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the Court stated, is a matter of tort law.71 The Court quoted from the wellknown English case, Hadley v. Baxendale, which stated that contract
damages “should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered as
either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of things, from
such breach of contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to
have been in the contemplation of both parties at the time they made the
contract as the probable result of the beach of it.”72 For the Court, that
meant Lane lost even if the testimony was overwhelming that his customers
would have left anyway, so long as their leaving was a “natural and
probable” (not but-for) consequence of the solicitation letter.73 Maybe
Lane’s clients would have found him on their own, but that is the way it is
supposed to be in these cases: “the issue is not whether the clients would
have left eventually, but whether they would have left when they did.”74
The point is that in misappropriation cases involving solicitations or
breaches of confidentiality, there will always be multiple reasons for a loss
in business, and many of them will have nothing to do with the defendant’s
breach. But they have a common denominator: the breach itself, followed
by the loss in business. The amount of damages can be questioned at that
point, but it is hard to imagine that the breach itself did not play a major
role. One last case on this issue illustrates the point and involves a familiar
fact pattern. In Ohrn v. JP Morgan Chase & Co., a banker left JP Morgan
to work for Wells Fargo but was restricted by a valid non-solicitation
agreement and confidentiality agreement protecting customer names.75
Nevertheless, once at his new employer, the banker “announced” his new
position by mailing a postcard from Wells Fargo to 500 Chase customers.76
He provided Wells Fargo with these customers’ names and addresses,
which he knew from his work at JP Morgan.77
The federal district court found that the banker breached his
agreement and rejected the argument that evidence of causation was
lacking. There was no need for expert testimony (or even non-expert), the
Court stated; noting that this was not a products liability case, nor a
medical case in which the “final cause” of a disease is important.78 The
Court saw it as a simple contracts case, and the breach combined with the

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
Id. at 13 (quoting Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)).
See id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
No. 13-80136-Civ., 2014 WL 3809181, at *5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 1, 2014).
See id. at *2.
Id.
See id. at *6.
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fact that “millions of dollars of customer accounts were transferred to
Wells Fargo within six months after Plaintiff resigned . . . permits the
reasonable conclusion that the breach of the Agreement by Plaintiff caused
Defendants’ damages.”79
So the proper approach to damages in these misappropriation cases is
to ask whether they naturally flow from the defendant’s bad act, even when
other reasons also play a role, however large.80 In fact, it may be an
impossible burden for a plaintiff to prove “but for” causation in these cases.
It is possible that a former employee’s customers had other, legitimate
reasons (loyalty, desire for continuity, displeasure with service) to follow
him to his new job, and that those reasons would have caused them to do so
even without solicitation. But we will never know in the same way that we
cannot know if a physician who failed to diagnose a patient’s serious
illness really shortened her life. She might have died anyway, even with
the correct diagnosis.81 Back to the lost customer case: perhaps if the
plaintiff produced testimony from every single former customer, who
testified that the solicitation caused their decision to make a move, the
testimony would be conclusive. But the plaintiff should not need to
produce conclusive evidence of that sort.82
V.

SHIFTING THE BURDEN

It may be helpful to think of causation in these cases as
“probabilistic,”83 which is to say that the plaintiff probably but not
necessarily caused the defendant’s loss. “Probably” is enough, as we can
see from the way courts approach causation in other business cases.
Consider the case in which bidders for tax liens at a county auction cheat

79. Id.
80. There may be more than one proximate cause for an injury. See Bentley v. Saunemin Twp., 83
Ill. 2d 10, 16 (1980).
81. This is Judge Posner’s point in BCS Services Inc. v. Heartwood 88, LLC. See 637 F.3d 750,
758 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Otherwise how could a person obtain a judgment for medical malpractice based
on a failure to diagnose a disease that proved fatal but had it been diagnosed earlier might have been
cured?”).
82. The very nature of the civil standard (preponderance of the evidence) rules out conclusive
proof. See generally John Leubsdorf, The Surprising History of the Preponderance Standard of Civil
Proof, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1569, 1573 (2015) (noting that California has “devoted much attention to its jury
instructions [and] has adopted what may be the clearest and simplest formulation: ‘A party must
persuade you, by the evidence presented in court, that what he or she is required to prove is more likely
to be true than not,’ adding that the jury should consider all the evidence, and that the reasonable doubt
standard does not apply to civil trials.”).
83. See BCS Servs., Inc., 637 F.3d at 758.
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by flooding the room with too many bidders, meaning they have more arms
in the air when the auctioneer decides who won the right to pay the
delinquent taxes on a property and in exchange receive the county’s lien.84
The property owner either pays the back taxes to the new lien holder or the
holder can obtain a tax deed on the property, thereby becoming the
property’s owner. Because some property owners cannot pay the back
taxes, winning at the auction can be very profitable later on.85
What if the “bids” are not really competitive at all because most of the
bids are the same: they agree to pay the full amount of the back taxes in
exchange for the lien with no reduction. In that case, the auctioneer has no
real basis to choose one hand in the air over another, especially when they
are raised quickly and at the same time.86
Flooding the rooms with extra hands should result in more “winning”
bids, albeit by cheating.87 The odds are very small that the cheating would
have no effect on the other bidders, especially when it can be proven that
they make bids on the same liens as the cheaters, who win over 40% of the
time when they have four times as many hands in the air (13) than they
should have (3).88 It is possible the plaintiff-bidders in this case would not
have won some of the bids anyway, even if the defendants had not cheated.
For example, the plaintiffs might not have been noticed by the
auctioneer (randomness), or might have been slow to raise their hands, but
the Seventh Circuit asked: “How likely is it that they lost no bids to bidders
who had 13 arms in the room but should have had only three?”89
The same question can be asked in misappropriation cases dealing
with customer lists and unlawful solicitations: Yes, it is possible that some
customers would have left anyway or moved their business for legitimate
reasons and in those cases the plaintiff may have no one but itself to blame,
but how likely is it that the former employer lost no business at all due to
the breach? It would be one thing if the numbers in that case were small
(few customers solicited, little business moved), but in many of these cases
hundreds of customers are solicited and millions of dollars are moved.90
There may still have been a chance to keep the customers, or even win
them back, but those are arguments about mitigation and not causation. As

84. See id. at 752-53.
85. See id.
86. See id. (“How is the auctioneer to pick the winner in such a case? It’s difficult!”)
87. Id.
88. Id. at 760.
89. Id. at 758.
90. See, e.g., Ohrn, JP Morgan Chase & Co., No. 13-80136-Civ., 2014 WL 3809181, at *5 (S.D.
Fla. Aug. 1, 2014).
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the Seventh Circuit stated, “Once a plaintiff presents evidence that he
suffered the sort of injury that would be the expected consequence of the
defendant’s wrongful conduct, he has done enough to withstand summary
judgment on the ground of absence of causation.”91 Indeed, he has done
enough to win at trial too, as the same evidentiary standard applies no
matter what stage the litigation is in after the complaint.92
A major problem in these cases is when the defendant seeks to
confuse causation with the other possible reasons for the plaintiff’s injury.
In essence, the defendant in a misappropriation case is saying “no harm, no
foul” when pointing to other reasons for the plaintiff’s losses.93 In the case
of an unlawful solicitation or misappropriation, the main alternative reason
may be allegiance to the former employee.94 Or it could be distrust of a
business that would seek to impose a restriction on a former employee. Or
it could be both reasons, and several others that are only limited by one’s
imagination.95
But a plaintiff in these cases should not be asked to “prove a series of
negatives” or “positively exclude every other possible cause” of his
injury.96 Indeed, once the plaintiff has established one unlawful reason for
his loss, the burden should shift to the defendant to prove that the same loss

91. See BCS Servs., 637 F.3d at 758.
92. See Mayer v. Gary Partners & Co., Ltd., 29 F.3d 330, 335 (7th Cir. 1994) (“We now adopt the
federal reasonable‐person standard across the board: pre-trial, mid-trial, post-trial, and on appeal, for
evaluating both the merits and quantum of relief.”).
93. The “no harm, no foul” standard sounds close to the notion of harmless error. But at least in
criminal cases when a court reviews a district court’s jury instructions for harmless error, the burden is
on the state, not the appellant. In other words, the defendant is not expected to prove that he would not
have been convicted but for the error. Rather, the burden is on the state to prove that he would have
been convicted anyway. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 26 (1967) (“[I]t is completely
impossible for us to say that the State has demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
prosecutor’s comments and the trial judge’s instruction did not contribute to the petitioner’s
convictions.”).
94. Individuals are free to compete against their former employers, of course, so long as they do
not start doing so while they are still employed. See RKI, Inc. v. Grimes, 177 F. Supp. 2d 859, 877
(N.D. Ill. 2001); see also Veco Corp. v. Babcock, 243 Ill. App. 3d 153 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). And
competition, without some breach of a fiduciary duty, is a “boon to society” even though it is also often
“ruthless, unprincipled, uncharitable, unforgiving.” Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van Der
Woude, 962 F.2d 1263, 1268 (7th Cir. 1992) (the counterbalance to the “moral shortcomings” of a
former employee is “to obtain no‐competition agreements.”).
95. For a discussion that covers the common causation arguments in business cases, see
Testosterone Replacement Therapy Prods. Liability Litigation Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings, Med.
Mut. of Ohio v. Abbvie, Inc., No. 14 C 8857, 2016 WL 427553, at * 10-14 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2016).
96. See BCS Servs., 637 F.3d at 757.
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would have occurred in the absence of, or “but for,” the unlawful act.97
A. SHIFTING THE BURDEN IN OTHER CASES
Shifting the burden of proving causation would be new to
misappropriation cases but not new in the law:
1. Discrimination Cases
Burden-shifting has been the method of proof in employment law
cases for years.98 Once a plaintiff has established that race, color, sex,
religion, or national origin was a motivating factor (not the only factor) in
an employment decision, he has established an unlawful employment
practice.99 He is not required nor expected to rule out other reasons for the
employer’s decision, of which there might be several.100 Still, he would
collect no money damages if his employer can prove that it would have
taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating
factor.101 In that case, the plaintiff can collect his attorneys’ fees and a
reinstatement order, but nothing else.102 The important point is that it is the
defendant, not the plaintiff, who bears the burden to prove that its
unlawfulness did not matter anyway.103

97. As explained below, this approach does not conflict with the “common law’s universal
requirement that the tort plaintiff prove causation,” or, put even more bluntly: “No hurt, no tort.”
Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1990).
98. The burden shifting can be dated to the Supreme Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins. See 490 U.S. 228, 258 (1989). In Price Waterhouse, a plurality of the Court decided that a
plaintiff could prevail on a discrimination claim if she could show that the protected characteristic was a
“motivating” or “substantial” factor in the employer’s decision, in which case the burden of persuasion
would shift to the employer, which could escape liability if it could prove that it would have taken the
same employment action in the absence of all discriminatory animus. Id. at 258. Two years after Price
Waterhouse, the Supreme Court passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which “substituted a new
burden‐shifting framework for the one endorsed by Price Waterhouse.” See U. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v.
Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2526 (2013). Under the 1991 Act, an employer’s proof that it would have
taken the same action saves it from money damages but not a finding of liability.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2015).
100. The 1991 Civil Rights Act explicitly states that a motivating factor of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin is unlawful “even though other factors also motivated the practice.” 42 U.S.C. §
2000e‐2(m).
101. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (2015).
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i) (2015); see also Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526.
103. See Nassar, 133 S. Ct. at 2526.
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2. Corporate Law
In cases in which directors are sued for breaching their duty of loyalty,
they typically rely on the business judgment rule, which is a presumption
that their decision was made in good faith.104 But the presumption can be
rebutted by proof of a breach of a fiduciary duty.105 In that case, the burden
shifts to the defendant-directors to establish that their decision was fair
despite their breach, which it would be if it caused the plaintiff no
damages.106 Shifting the burden to prove causation in that circumstance is
not “heresy”107 any more than it is in employment discrimination cases,108
and any more than it would be in misappropriation cases.
One might argue that the burden shift in employment law is statutory,
and it is true that aspects of the business judgment rule are also codified.109
But the Supreme Court introduced shifting the burden to prove causation in
employment cases before Congress formalized it.110
3. Trusts
Under the common law of trusts, “in matters of causation, when a
beneficiary has succeeded in proving that the trustee has committed a
breach of trust and that a related loss has occurred, the burden shifts to the
trustee to prove that the loss would have occurred in the absence of the
breach.”111 For this reason, courts have held that defendants in ERISA and
other employment laws, such as the Labor Management Reporting Act,
bear the burden of proving that their breaches of fiduciary duties did not
cause loss to the plaintiff.112 So there can be no suggestion that a federal
court would not be able to find support in the common law for shifting the
burden in misappropriation cases.
In fact, breach of fiduciary duty claims are often brought alongside
trade secret misappropriation claims because they are close cousins. An
employee who steals a company’s trade secrets has likely breached his
104. CDX Liquidating Tr. v. Venrock Assoc., 640 F.3d 209, 215 (7th Cir. 2011).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 217.
108. Id.
109. See MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT §§ 8.30-8.31 (AM. BAR FOUND. 2003).
110. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 292 (1989) (referring to a “Price Waterhouse”
instruction).
111. Tatum v. RJR Pension Inv. Comm., 761 F.3d 346, 362 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100 cmt. f).
112. See id. (listing cases).
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fiduciary duty of loyalty,113 and even if he has not, he has taken advantage
of his position of trust and done a bad act. That is the essence of the type
of claim in which courts shift the burden.
4. Wage and Hour Cases
A prime example of burden shifting exists in wage and hour cases
litigated under the Fair Labor Standards Act.114 In these cases, the precise
number of hours a plaintiff worked can be critical to the issue of wages,
overtime, and damages. The employer is in a better position to know the
number, along with the nature of the work, than an employee is.115
Moreover, by the time the employee would know enough to dispute the
amount she has been paid, which she would not know until she is actually
paid, it would be too late to make a record of her hours or document them
in real time. For these reasons, “once an employee proves he or she ‘has in
fact performed work’ that was improperly compensated, and presents
enough evidence to allow an inference as to the amount of this work, the
burden shifts to the employer to prove the precise amount of work
performed or to negate the inference drawn from the employee’s
evidence.”116 Any other result would be backwards117 as it would punish

113. Under many state laws, which are modeled on the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, that overlap
means the fiduciary claim is preempted or displaced by the trade secrets claim. See generally Robert C.
Denicola, The New Law of Ideas, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 195, 213-14 (2014) (discussing how the
fiduciary duty claim is preempted if it is another attempt at complaining about the misappropriation);
see also Composite Marine Propellers, Inc. v. Van der Woude, 962 F.2d 1263, 1265 (7th Cir. 1992).
But some courts make the mistake of tying the two claims together. A defendant does not get to steal
information just because it is not secret any more than it can steal office equipment. See Hecny Trans.,
Inc. v. Chu, 430 F.3d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 2005) (“If Hecny had put its customer list on its web site for the
world to ogle, that would not have permitted its managers to go into covert competition using Hecny’s
own depot and staff, or to walk off with computers and fax machines, as Hecny alleges Chu did.”). In
addition, the fiduciary duty claim should not be preempted at all by any post‐employment
misappropriation because a typical employee’s fiduciary duty ends once the employment is over.
Jostens, Inc. v. Kauffman, 842 F. Supp. 352, 354 (C.D. Ill. 1994).
114. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et. seq. (2012).
115. The employer has a statutory duty to keep such records. See 29 C.F.R. 516.2‐516.6.
116. Amaral v. Cintas Corp. No. 2, 163 Cal. App. 4th 1157, 1189 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Co., 328 U.S. 680, 687 (1946), superseded in part by statute, 29
U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (2015), as recognized in Integrity Staffing Sols., Inc. v. Busk, 135 S. Ct. 513, 516-17
(2014)).
117. It would be simpler if Congress amended the FLSA to codify this sensible burden‐shifting. By
contrast, sometimes a statute contains burden shifting even when it makes little sense. Consider an
obscure Illinois Drainage Code that shifts the burden to objector‐plaintiffs once the drainage district
commissioners vote to increase the fee paid by taxpayers. In that case, the objectors must produce
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the employee for her employer’s shoddy records and enable the employer
to get away with not paying an employee what she earned.118
5. Legal Malpractice Cases
The burden of proof also shifts in professional negligence or
malpractice cases. Imagine a case in which an attorney fails to preserve his
plaintiff’s automobile after a wreck.119 His negligence means that she
cannot prove the car was defective, so it is impossible for her to prove her
products liability case.120
But would she have won anyway? A better way to phrase it is this: we
don’t know whether she would have won if she still possessed the car;
maybe there were other reasons against her that would have defeated her
claim, in which case the lawyer’s negligence resulted in no real injury or
damages. But we do know for certain that without the car she must lose.
In that case, it is reasonable to shift the burden to the lawyer to prove that
she would have lost in all events.121 Otherwise, the attorney’s destruction
leaves her with no remedy whatsoever because it has killed off both her
claims: the products liability case and the negligence claim against him.122
6. Trade Secret Cases
Even in trade secret cases it is not unheard of to shift the burden.
Consider the case where a plaintiff points to evidence that a defendant had
access to secret product designs, perhaps because they were considering a
joint venture.123 If the defendant then produces the same design but claims
it was accomplished through reverse engineering, then a court has held that

evidence to rebut the commissioner’s decision, perhaps by showing that the fee increase is too much or
that what the commissioners would do with the fee is too risky. But if they cannot prove their objection
has merit, then commissioners who must petition the court for the fee increase win simply because their
say‐so is treated as a “prima facie case.” See Upper Salt Fork Drainage Dist. v. DiNovo, 904 N.E.2d
84, 95-96 (Ill. Ct. App. 2008). That’s much stronger footing than a plaintiff in a federal discrimination
case enjoys. In the discrimination case, an unrebutted prima facie case does not require a verdict in her
favor. She still has to prove discrimination.
118. See Anderson, 328 U.S. at 688 (noting that the burden shifting is also fair because in an unpaid
wage case “damage is . . . certain” and the “uncertainty lies only in the amount of damages”).
119. See e.g., Galanek v. Wismar, 68 Cal. App. 4th 1417, 1425-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1426.
123. See Bolt Assoc., Inc. v. Alpine Geophysical Assoc., Inc., 365 F.2d 742, 749 (3rd Cir. 1966).
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it has the burden of proof to show independent development.124 That’s true
whether or not the a court treats the independent development argument as
an affirmative defense,125 and it is also true if the defendant says it actually
followed the design specifications of a third party who also had access to it.
In that case, the defendant should prove that both its and the third party’s
designs were “free from misappropriation” because they each had access to
a trade secret in “high confidence” and “to hold otherwise would leave a
door open for an entrusted party to make a plaintiff’s proof problems
insuperable through the collaboration of a third party.”126
7. Sanctions
Lawyers themselves are sometimes on the receiving end of
burden‐shifting in the form of sanctions. A court always has the inherent
authority to sanction lawyers for misconduct,127 but as a general rule it is
not to be done without notice and an opportunity for the lawyer to be
heard.128 It is called a “rule to show cause,”129 and under the rule the
lawyer must prove a negative: that he should not be sanctioned for his
conduct.130 Sometimes the court goes ahead with the sanction, sometimes
not. But in either case, the burden is on the lawyer, who is like a defendant

124. See id.; see also Droeger v. Welsh Sporting Goods Corp., 541 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1976)
(“[D]isclosure of the [trade] secret to the defendant, followed by manufacture of a closely similar
device by the defendant, shifts to the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence to prove, if it
can, that it arrived at the process by independent invention.”).
125. But see Sargent Fletcher, Inc. v. Able Corp., 110 Cal. App. 4th 1658, 1669-70 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003) (court would not shift the burden to defendant but it “acts at its peril” if it fails to produce its own
evidence of independent development and noting that improper use and independent development are
simply “opposite sides of the same coin”). See also Moore v. Kulicke & Soffa Inds., Inc. 318 F.3d 561,
568-69 (3rd Cir. 2003) (noting “no consensus on the issue” of who has the burden to prove independent
development and also “not[ing] that the authors of the major treatises dealing with trade secret
misappropriation come to different conclusions”).
126. See Bolt Assoc., 365 F.2d at 749 (referring to the defendant’s burden as a heavy “burden of
persuasion,” not just a burden of production).
127. See Methode Elec., Inc. v. Adam Tech., Inc., 371 F.3d 923, 927 (7th Cir. 2004) (“Rule 11 has
not robbed the district courts of their inherent power to impose sanctions for abuse of the judicial
system.”). See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 49 (1991).
128. See Methode Elec., 371 F.3d at 928.
129. See Carr v. O’Leary, 167 F.3d 1124, 1128 (7th Cir. 1999); see also FED. R. APP. P. 38
(frivolous appeal may result in sanctions, including awarding double costs to the appellee, in which case
the court may issue an order to show cause; see In re Messina, 437 Fed. App’x. 478, 480 (7th Cir.
2011)).
130. See Carr, 167 F.3d at 1128 (“We shall therefore issue to the attorney general’s office a rule to
show cause why the authors of the brief should not be sanctioned for unethical advocacy.”).
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in the matter.131
8. Some Tort Cases
As a further example of shifting the causation burden, defendants
often confuse the causation issue (either intentionally or not) by arguing
that the plaintiff’s own actions, or other external factors such as market
conditions, are the real causes for the plaintiff’s loss. They say these are
supervening causes, but really they are not. Supervening causes come after
the initial culpable act and usually culpable themselves. When a truck
leaks gasoline and a plaintiff is injured after a lighted match is dropped into
the pool of gasoline formed from the leak, the second event is supervening
and it makes the plaintiff’s injury unforeseeable and dooms his claim.132 In
fact, the defendant in a misappropriation case is really proposing
alternative or joint causes for the plaintiff’s loss. But it would not matter if
the causes were treated as supervening because in those cases the burden of
proving the cause is also on the defendant, not the plaintiff.133
9. Patent Cases
There is one final comparison that is helpful so the complaint cannot
be made that any burden-shifting in these cases would be unprecedented.
Patent cases often involve similar issues of causation; indeed, when it
comes to lost profits in patent cases, the real question is: “had the infringer
not infringed, what would the patentee holder-licensee have made?”134 As
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit stated, “[t]his surely states a
‘but for’ test.”135 But burden-shifting occurs after the plaintiff in a patent
case establishes demand for its product, a capability to exploit the demand,
its profit, and the absence of non-infringing substitutes.136 In that case,

131. Id.
132. See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Subscription Plus, Inc., 299 F.3d 618, 621 (7th Cir. 2002).
133. See BCS Servs. Inc. v. Heartwood 88, LLC, 637 F.3d 750, 757 (7th Cir. 2011) (“In technical
legal terms the burden of proving an ‘intervening cause’ – something that snaps the ‘causal chain’ (that
is, operates as a ‘supervening cause,’ wiping out the defendant’s liability, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 440 (1965)) that connects the wrongful act to the defendant’s injury – is on the
defendant.”).
134. See Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538, 1545 (Fed. Cir. 1995), quoting Aro Mfg.
Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 507 (1964).
135. See Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1545.
136. See id. (describing the so‐called “Panduit test” in patent cases, which is one way for a patent
plaintiff to prove it is entitled to lost profit damages); see Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works,
Inc., 575 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1978).
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courts have held that the plaintiff has established a prima facie case on the
“but for” causation issue and the “burden then shifts to the infringer to
show that the inference is unreasonable for some or all of the lost sales.”137
For the patent plaintiff the wrinkle is sometimes showing the absence
of substitutes, or, in other words, that it was the only other place the
infringer’s sales could have landed. But in so doing, it is not the plaintiff’s
burden to disprove every possibility, however remote. “A patentee need
not negate every possibility that the purchaser might not have purchased a
product other than its own, absent the infringement.”138 The “but for”
standard is one based on reasonable probability.139
Both words,
‘reasonable’ and ‘probability,’ dilute but-for causation down to simply a
strong inference. Indeed, “inference” is the word the Federal Circuit has
used before shifting the causation burden to the defendant.140
If the causation burden can shift in employment, trust, malpractice,
and other IP patent cases,141 to name a few,142 then it can shift under the

137. Rite-Hite Corp., 56 F.3d at 1545.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. In some cases, courts say that what shifts to the infringer in a patent case is the burden of
production, or the burden of “going forward,” not the ultimate burden of persuasion. See, e.g., Micro
Chem., Inc. v. Lextron, Inc., 318 F.3d 1119, 1125 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (once plaintiff advances a prima
facie case of lost profits, burden on infringer to show that the patentee would not have made all the
diverted sales “but for” the infringement, which might happen if there were other suppliers or if the
infringing supplier had two available alternatives on the market and only one was infringing; in that
latter scenario, “even absent the infringement, customers may have selected the infringer’s available,
non‐infringing alternative over the patented invention”); see also SEVENTH CIR. FED. CIV. JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 11.4.3.1 [hereafter FED. CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS] (detailing so‐called “Panduit test”
and including a Committee Comment No. 7: “The burden of proof shifts to the defendant to disprove
lost sales once the patent owner introduces sufficient evidence to satisfy the Panduit test”; citing RiteHite, 56 F.3d at 1545). It remains to be seen whether burden shifting under Panduit in patent cases
survives the Supreme Court’s recent patent decision in Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures,
LLC. See 134 S. Ct. 843, 849-50 (2014). In Medtronic, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiff in a
patent case always has the burden of persuasion to prove infringement, even if it is the potential
infringer who brings the case and seeks a declaration that it did not infringe. Id. The Court did allow,
however, that there could be exceptions to the rule that plaintiffs always bear the burden of proof if an
element of a claim is closer to an affirmative defense. And “based on considerations of fairness” the
rule “does not place the burden upon a litigant of establishing facts peculiarly within the knowledge of
his adversary.” Id. Under this standard, in a trade secret misappropriation case it is fair to make the
defendant prove the plaintiff would have suffered the same losses absent the theft, especially when the
plaintiff’s lost customers are most likely now the defendant’s customers, which means the defendant
has more knowledge about how they became customers than the plaintiff.
142. The burden of proof shifts under the Trademark (Lanham) Act, too: “In assessing profits the
plaintiff shall be required to prove defendant’s sales only; defendant must prove all elements of cost or
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new Trade Secrets Act, too.
B. WHEN DOES THE PLAINTIFF’S INJURY OCCUR ANYWAY?
For the reasons discussed above, there should be little reluctance to
shift the causation burden once liability is settled and only the issue of
damages remains. And there should be no hesitation at all in cases where
the defendant’s actions mean the plaintiff has lost exclusivity over a thing
of value.143 Say a person’s option to buy a property is stolen by another.144
Thereafter the property increases in value and the person sues over the lost
opportunity.145 There is no question about the wrongful act, but there is no
guarantee that the plaintiff would have exercised his option to buy or even
sell the property later at the correct time. It is hard to prove that either
would have happened, which makes it particularly difficult to prove
damages.146 In that case, maybe nothing shifts to the defendant in the first
place and the lost opportunity is enough for the jury to quantify.147
In fact, perhaps it is a mistake for the plaintiff to worry about
establishing monetary damages in the first place when economic injury
should be enough.148
deduction claimed.” 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2015). Even before the Lanham Act, the Supreme Court
stated that in trademark cases “[i]f it can be shown that the infringement had no relation to profits made
by the defendant, that some purchasers bought goods bearing the infringing mark because of the
defendant’s recommendation or his reputation or for any reason other than a response to the diffused
appeal of the plaintiff’s symbol, the burden of showing this is upon the poacher.”). Mishawaka Rubber
& Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 206 (1942), superseded by statute, Lanham Act,
§ 35,15 U.S.C. § 1117 (1946), as recognized by Banff, Ltd. v. Colberts, Inc., 996 F.2d 33, 35 n.1 (2nd
Cir. 1993) (“To the extent that Mishawaka is inconsistent with § 35 of the Lanham Act it is no longer
good law.”).
143. See FMC Corp. v. Boesky, 852 F.2d 981, 994 (7th Cir. 1988) (referring to plaintiff’s injury in a
misappropriation case as the loss of the exclusive use of its confidential business information).
144. Trade secrets are property too. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987);
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984).
145. Whether the option would count as property would depend on state law. For example,
California recognizes an unexercised option to purchase real estate as a property right; Indiana does not.
See Pro‐Eco, Inc. v. Bd. of Commrs. of Jay Cty., 57 F.3d 505, 509 (7th Cir. 1995).
146. Even when an actual investment (not an option) is wiped out, it is difficult to prove why, which
is the essence of causation. See Bastian v. Petren Res. Corp., 892 F.2d 680, 684 (7th Cir. 1990)
(plaintiffs’ losses may be explained by fact that “[i]t happens that 1981 was a peak year for oil prices
and that those prices declined steady in the succeeding years”).
147. At a certain point a loss or lost opportunity is too indirect to be compensable. See O’Bannon v.
Twn. Ct. Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773, 787-88 (1980) (nursing home patients had no property right after
government rescinded license of nursing home).
148. Like the state statutes, the new Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 provides for injunctive relief.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1836 (West 2016).
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Someone who steals another’s enjoyable artwork can be sued even if it
is returned shortly after the theft. The loss of enjoyment may not be easy
work for the jury to put a number to, but the need for imagination is not a
good reason for a plaintiff, who has unquestionably been wronged, to
lose.149 It would create the wrong incentives if that were the case.150
For that reason, it is fair to question the understanding that the injury
in trade secret misappropriation cases is the use of the secret and not its
theft in the first place.151
A burglar who steals and later returns an owner’s best silverware has
injured the owner whether or not he ever uses the silverware (and for that
matter whether or not the owner would have used the silverware).152
Otherwise, the owner could lose his case for the following reasons: he
cannot prove that he would have held a dinner party, or that his guests
would have accepted, or that, if he went ahead and held the party without
his best silverware, anyone noticed or cared about the cheap silverware that
he used. And if he actually chose not to hold the party on account of the
burglary, then he cannot prove that weather would not have kept some of
the same guests away or that they would not have canceled for other
reasons. There are lots of ways to throw sand at the eyes of a judge or a
jury.153
A business may be more likely to sue over a stolen trade secret such as
a customer list than the host who is upset over his silverware, but the

149. While the damages numbers can be tied to different theories, they still have to be calculated
correctly. See Taylor v. Meirick, 712 F.2d 1112, 1119-22 (7th Cir. 1983) (discussing value of
copyrighted maps that were infringed upon).
150. As the Supreme Court has stated, “Where the tort itself is of such a nature as to preclude the
ascertainment of the amount of damages with certainty, it would be a perversion of fundamental
principles of justice to deny all relief to the injured person, and thereby relieve the wrongdoer from
making any amend for his acts. In such case, while the damages may not be determined by mere
speculation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence show the extent of the damages as a matter of just
and reasonable inference, although the result be only approximate. The wrongdoer is not entitled to
complain that they cannot be measured with the exactness and precision that would be possible if the
case, which he alone is responsible for making, were otherwise.” Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson
Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563 (1931).
151. See U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Lafarge N. Am. Inc., No. 03 C 6027, 2009 WL 3871824, at * 2 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 16, 2009) (“Absent evidence that Defendants did, in fact, use USG information in some way,
Plaintiff’s monetary recovery for misappropriation will be limited to nominal damages.”).
152. If this were not true, then there would be no suit for a trespasser’s interference with the private
use and enjoyment of land. But there is. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Super. Ct., 920 P.2d 669,
696 (Cal. 1996) (“liability for nuisance does not require proof of damage to the plaintiff’s property;
proof of interference with the plaintiff’s use and enjoyment of that property is sufficient”).
153. See BCS Servs. Inc. v. Heartwood 88, LLC, 637 F.3d 750, 758 (7th Cir. 2011).
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thinking should be the same.154 Once the secret has been stolen, the injury
is done.155 Forcing the plaintiff to disprove a series of negatives, or rule out
speculative what-ifs, means more testimony (much of it expert), much
more expense,156 and less protection for the owner. The interests of justice
weigh in here, and those are the owner’s interests, too.
C. NOT HALLOWED GROUND
There may be arguments against shifting the causation burden in these
cases, but one of them cannot be that the notion of causation is welldefined and sacrosanct in the first place. One need look no further than
employment law court decisions,157 and law review articles about them158
over the past several decades. The simplest words, “because of” (sex, race,
color, religion, and national origin) have turned out to be confounding.159

154. The silverware owner, in theory, should be more willing to sue as no one questions whether the
silverware is property, while the customer list is only property if it is a trade secret.
155. “The proper criterion is not ‘actual use’ but whether the trade secret is ‘of value’ to the
company.” Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. Playwood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 727 (7th Cir. 2003). See
also Parus Holdings, Inc. v. Banner & Witcoff, Ltd., 585 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1004-05 (N.D. Ill. 2008)
(misappropriation under the Illinois Trade Secrets Act, which was modeled after the Uniform Act, does
not require use of the trade secret; use of the trade secret is “just one of three ways – improper
acquisition, unauthorized use, or unauthorized disclosure – in which misappropriation can be shown”).
156. Too many of these cases take years to litigate as it is, which violates the first Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (instructing courts and litigants that the Rules should be
“construed, administered, and employed by the court and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding”).
157. See Richard A. Epstein, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAWS 357 (1992) (“The early cases under Title VII did not regard sexual harassment
as a form of sex discrimination because acts of harassment did not reflect official firm policy but were
only the individual actions of company personnel exercised for their own benefit.”).
158. See Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 333, 346 (1990) (arguing that “Congress would have been quite surprised to
learn that they had contemplated including sexual harassment within the confines of sex discrimination
– especially since the term ‘sexual harassment’ did not come into currency until the late 1970s”).
159. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 237 (1989) (containing a discussion of the
term “because of sex”). While “because of” would seem to imply that motive matters, that has not
always been the case in federal courts. See, e.g., Doe v. City of Belleville, 119 F.3d 563, 576 (7th Cir.
1997) (stating that “[i]t is not clear” why proof of motivation is needed “when the harassment has
explicit sexual overtones”). See also Ocheltree v. Scollon Prods., Inc., 308 F.3d 351, 375 (Michael, J.,
dissenting) (“I believe, however, that the ‘because of sex’ requirement allows for more interpretive
flexibility than the majority recognizes.”), vacated, 335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc). But see
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998) (citing Doe as a decision suggesting
“workplace harassment that is sexual in content is always actionable, regardless of . . . motivations” and
rejecting such an “automatic[] discrimination” rule). Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
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Does it mean “but for” causation and does it mean that motive matters?160
In the case of sexual harassment, some courts161 and scholars162 read out
motive entirely and essentially argue for a disparate impact claim.163 And
in the case of sexual orientation discrimination, which is not explicitly
prohibited under federal employment law, the issue is whether “because of
. . . sex” is open-ended enough to include a gender nonconformity lawsuit,
or can be interpreted to include sexual orientation discrimination in any
case.164 In other words, causation is already a mess;165 shifting the burden
in trade secret cases is not tampering with perfection.
Nor, as discussed above, can the arguments be that shifting the burden
is never done, or is not fair, or is against public policy. It is done in some
cases, including employment law cases, which essentially is what trade
secret cases are when they involve former employees. It is fair, too,

160. The most useful description of what “because of” means comes from Price Waterhouse: “The
critical inquiry, the one commanded by the words of [the statute], is whether gender was a factor in the
employment decision at the moment it was made.” 490 U.S. at 241 (emphasis in original).
161. See supra note 133.
162. See Katherine M. Franke, What’s Wrong With Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REV. 691, 772
(1997) (“The wrong of sexual harassment must consist of something more than that the conduct would
not have occurred ‘but for’ the sex of the target. . . . [S]exual harassment is sex discrimination precisely
because its use and effect police heteropatriarchal gender norms in the workplace.”).
163. For a critique of these efforts, see generally, Robert A. Kearney, The Disparate Impact Hostile
Environment Claim: Sexual Harassment Scholarship at a Crossroads, 20 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J.
185, 210-21 (2003) (discussing the suggestion that all sexual conduct is because of sex and asking
“How could that be?”).
164. The Circuits are in conflict over the issue. For a review of the cases and the issues, see Hively
v. Ivy Tech., No. 15‐1720, 2016 WL 4039703 at *10 (7th Cir. July 28, 2016) (following Circuit
precedent and ruling that Title VII does not cover sexual orientation discrimination but quoting Chief
Justice John Roberts from an oral argument in Obergefell v. Hodges, 235 S. Ct. 2584 (2015): “[I]f Sue
loves Joe and Tom loves Joe, Sue can marry him and Tom can’t. And the difference is based upon their
different sex. Why isn’t that a straightforward question of sexual discrimination?”).
165. The best evidence of the mess, or at least messiness, comes from this summary in the Supreme
Court’s Nassar opinion: “In sum, Title VII defines the term ‘unlawful employment practice’ as
discrimination on the basis of any of seven prohibited criteria: race, color, religion, sex, national origin,
opposition to employment discrimination, and submitting or supporting a complaint about employment
discrimination. The text of § 2000e–2(m) mentions just the first five of these factors, the status‐based
ones; and it omits the final two, which deal with retaliation. When it added § 2000e–2(m) to Title VII
in 1991, Congress inserted it within the section of the statute that deals only with those same five
criteria, not the section that deals with retaliation claims or one of the sections that apply to all claims of
unlawful employment practices. Based on these textual and structural indications, the Court now
concludes as follows: Title VII retaliation claims must be proved according to traditional principles of
but‐for causation, not the lessened causation test stated in § 2000e–2(m). This requires proof that the
unlawful retaliation would not have occurred in the absence of the alleged wrongful action or actions of
the employer.” U. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2533 (2013).
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because once the defendant steals a trade secret, it becomes the most
obvious source of the plaintiff’s resulting loss and the defendant’s gain.166
Is it any different from the famous case Summers v. Tice, in which the
burden is put on the defendants to prove which of the hunters fired the shot
that struck the plaintiff?167 Not really, because in that case the burden is
placed on the bad actors to sort it out.168 In a trade secret misappropriation
case, there is only one bad actor, so once theft is established, the burden
should be all his to prove he is not to blame.
Shifting the burden to the defendant does not excuse the plaintiff from
proving that it was injured. And it is less aggressive than excluding the
defendant’s evidence altogether on the issue of causation, which has been
done.169
D. WRITING THE JURY INSTRUCTION
The final test is whether shifting the burden can be reflected in a jury
instruction that a jury would understand. As it stands, jury instructions in
trade secret cases are not uniform. In the mid-1980s, the American Bar
Association proposed jury instructions in trade secret litigation cases and170
when it came to damages, the ABA’s version did not even use the word
cause: “The amount [of damages] may be based on the loss plaintiff has
suffered from the misappropriation, or from the gain defendant has
procured, or from some combination of the two.”171 By any standard,

166. There is a tendency in these cases to look beyond the obvious and to imagine other causes for
an injury. But that should be the Defendant’s burden to prove, not the Plaintiff’s job to disprove.
167. 199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948). In Summers, plaintiff was shot in the eye (and once in the lip) on a
quail hunting trip; the shot in the eye produced most of plaintiff’s damages and could not have come
from both hunters. Rather, “[i]t was from one or the other only.” Id. Because both hunters were
wrongdoers, “it should rest with them each to absolve himself if he can.” Id. “It is up to defendants to
explain the cause of the injury.” Id.
168. See id. (explaining why “defendants are in a far better position to offer evidence to determine
which one caused the injury”).
169. See GE Betz Inc. v. Conrad, 231 N.C. App. 214, 232 (2013) (finding no error in trial court’s
decision to exclude evidence that may have shown other reasons GE customers moved their business
away from GE, because “such evidence would not negate the fact that individual defendants improperly
solicited and unjustly profited . . . thus causing some amount of injury to GE and therefore meeting the
element of causation”); see also Dowd & Dowd v. Gleason, 181 Ill.2d 460, 484-85 (1998) (the “focus
here is not on the conduct of the client in terminating the relationship, but on the conduct of the party
inducing the breach or interfering with the expectancy”).
170. See Lawrence J. Siskind, ABA Proposes Jury Instructions for Trade Secret Litigation, TRADE
SECRET REPORTER, July 1985, at 56.
171. Id. at 60.
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“suffered from” is more passive and less direct than “caused by.”172
Jury instructions should track the language of a statute whenever
possible (otherwise they run the risk of lawyers re-writing the statute
during jury instruction conferences).173 So the instructions under the
federal act should use the word “caused by” in this way, “If you find that
defendant misappropriated plaintiff’s trade secret, you may award
damages.
Damages can include both the actual loss caused by
misappropriation and the unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation
that is not addressed in computing damages for actual loss.”174
For the reasons explained above, once the plaintiff has proven
misappropriation, say by establishing a defendant’s use of a secret
customer list or strategic plan, how can it prove what would have happened
had the theft not occurred? And, more importantly, why should it have
to?175
Once a plaintiff in a trade secret misappropriation case has proven
injury in the form of damages, then the burden should shift to the defendant
to prove that the plaintiff would have suffered the same losses even if the
defendant had not misappropriated. In employment discrimination cases
the burden shifts in this way in the Seventh Circuit: “If you find that
Plaintiff has proved that his [protected class] contributed to Defendant’s
decision to [adverse employment action] him, you must then decide
whether Defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that it
would have [adverse employment action] him even if Plaintiff was not
[protected class].”176 In that case, the jury “must enter a verdict for the
Plaintiff but you may not award him damages.”177
The equivalent instruction in a trade secret misappropriation case

172. Suffer, vt. “to submit to or be forced to endure.” Cause, n. “something that occasions or effects
a result.” WEBSTER’S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 133, 878 (1967).
173. See United States v. Paul, 217 F.3d 989, 997 (8th Cir. 2000) (“The best way to comply with
[the Federal Death Penalty Act] is to actually use the language of the statute in the jury instruction.”);
see also Gacy v. Welborn, 994 F.2d 305, 312 (7th Cir. 1993) (legal rules are hard enough to understand
without rewriting them, which is “one reason why this court strongly discourages efforts to define
‘reasonable doubt’” for juries).
174. See 18 U.S.C. § 1836(b)(3)(B) (2015).
175. In addition to the reasons explained above, consider what happens in an investor fraud case,
which often involves complicating causation issues because markets are naturally volatile. But in those
cases, “[t]he requirement, if any, to plead a causal link [between the fraud and the losses] does not place
on Plaintiffs a further pleading obligation to rule out other contributing factors or alternative causal
explanations.” Loreley Financing (Jersey) No. 3 Ltd. v. Wells Fargo Secs., LLC, 797 F.3d 160, 189
(2nd Cir. 2015).
176. FED. CIV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 141, § 3.01, Comm. comment c.
177. See id.
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should be, “If you determine that Plaintiff has proved misappropriation of
its trade secrets and has been damaged, you must determine whether
Defendant proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff’s
losses, or Defendant’s gain, would have resulted even if Defendant had not
misappropriated. In that case, you must enter a verdict for Plaintiff but you
may not award him damages.”
VI. CONCLUSION
Once a plaintiff has established a loss, or a defendant’s gain, that
would naturally result from the defendant’s misappropriation, its job should
be done. The plaintiff has proven all the necessary elements of the
misappropriation claim. If the defendant has other theories as to why the
losses occurred, then let it say so, and then prove them. In that case, it may
escape paying some damages.
However, the defendant has still
misappropriated, and remains liable.
For years courts have filled up a graveyard with cases that did not
account for every possible alternative cause of the plaintiff’s losses. The
result is perverse: the more disruptive the misappropriation, the less likely
the plaintiff will be able to show the jury a clear picture of what happened
and prove “but for” causation. But the new federal law frees courts from
those cases and from the state misappropriation statutes that produced
them.178 What is needed now is a shift in thinking, and a shift in a burden.

178. It is not the only step that federal courts should take in these cases. Among the other steps:
adopting the Restatement (Second) of Agency’s framework for respondeat superior liability and when an
employer can be liable for an agent’s misappropriation, even if it occurred outside the scope of the
agent’s employment; and quickly determining that there are no limits to the definition of “trade secret”
so long as the information is, in fact, kept secret.

